The Double Life of MathemaUcs
Are mathemat ical ideas invented or discovered? This question has been repeatedly posed by philosophers through the ages. and will probab ly be with us forever. We shall not be concerned with the answer.
Whal matters is that by asking the question, we acknowledge the tact that mathematics has been leading a double life.
In the first of its lives. mathematics deals with fads like any other science. It is a fact that the altitudes of a triangle meet at a point, it is a fact that there are only seventeen kinds of symmetry in the plane. it is a fact that there are only five non-linear differential equations with fixedsingularities. it is a fact that every finite groupof odd order is solvable. The work of a mathematician consists in dealing with these facts in various ways. When mathematicians lalk to each other. they tell the 'acts of mathematics. In their research work. mathematicians study the facts of mathematics with a taxonomic zeal similar to that of the botanist who studies the properties Of some rare plant.
The facts of mathematics are as useful as the facts of any other science. No matter how abstruse they may appear at first. sooner or later they find their way back to practical applications. The facts of group theory. for example. may appear abstract and remote. but the practical applications of group theory have been numerous. and they have occurred in ways that no one might have anticipated. The facts of today's mathematics are the springboard for the science of tomorrow.
HMNNewsletter #6
In its second life. mathematicsdeals with proofs. A mathematical theory begins with definitions, and derives its resutts from cJearty agreed upon rules of inference. Every fact of mathematics must be ensconced in an axcmatctneory andformallyprovedif it is to be accepted as lrue. AxKlmatic exposnon is indispensable in mathematics, because the fact of mathematics. unlike the facts ot physics. are not amenable to experimental verification.
The axomatk method of mathematics is one ot the great achievements ot our cunure. However. it is only a method. Whereas the facts of mathematics, once discovered, wiD never change. the method by which these facts are verified has changed many times in the past. and it would be fOOlhardy not to expect that it will not change again at some future date.
The Double Life of Philosophy
The successof mathematicsin leading a double life haslong beenthe envyof philosophy.anotherfield which also is blessed -or maybe we should say cursed -to live in two wol1ds, but which has nor been quite as comfortable with its double life, Inthe firstof its lives, philosophysetsto itself the task of telling us how to look at the world. Philosophy is effective at correcting and redireding our thi~ing . It helps us do irNay with glaring prejudices and unwarranted assurrptions. Philosophy lays bare contradictionsthat we woukf rather avoidfacing up to. PhiJosophtcal descriptionsmake us aware of phenomena that lie at the other end of the spectrum ot rationality. phenomena which science will not and cannot deal with.
The assertions of philosophy are less reliable than the assertions of mathematics. but they run deeper into the roots of our existence.
The philosophical assertions of today will be part of the convnon sense of torcrrow.
In its second life,philosophy ,like mathematics, relies on a methOd of argumentation that seems to follow the rules of some logic or other. But the method of philo· sophical reasoning, unlike the method of mathematical reasoning, has never been clearly agreed upon by philosophers, and much philosophical discussion since the beginnings in Greece has been spent on discussions 01 method . Philosophy's relationship with Goddess Reason is closer to a forced cohabitation than to the romantic liaison that has always existed between Goddess Reason and mathematics .
The assertions of philosophy are tentative and partial. It is not even clear what it is that philosophy deals with. II used to be said that philosophy was "pUrely speculative ,· and this used to be an expression of praise.
But lately the word "speculative" has become a Bad Word.
Philosophical argumenls are errotion-laden 10 a greater degree than mathematical arguments . Pnilosophy is etten written in a style which is more reminiscent of a shameful admission than of a dispassionate description. Beh ird every question of philosophy there lurks a gnart of unacknowledged emolional cravings which act as powerful motivation for conclusions inwhich reason plays at best a supporting role . To bring such hidden emotional cravings out into the open , as philosophers have felt it their duty toclo, is to call fortrouble. Philosophical disclosures are frequently met w~h the anger that we reserve for the betrayal of our lamily secrets.
This confused state of affairs makes philosophical reasoning more difficull ,butfarrrore rewarding . Allhough philosophical arguments are blended with emotion, although philosophy seldom reaches a finn conclusion, althOugh the method of philosophy has never been clearly agreed upon, nonetheless, the assertions of phiIosop hy. tentative and partial as they are . come far clo ser to the truth of our existence thantbe prootsot mathematics.
The Loss of Autonomy
Philosophers of all times, beginning with Thales and Socrates. have suffered from the recurring suspicions about the soundness 01 their work, and have responded to them as best they could .
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The latest reaction against the crilicismof philosophy began aroundthe tumor the century and is still very much with us.
Tcday's philosophers (not all of them, Icrtunatejyl have become greal be lievers in mathemataation. The y have rewritten Gatllec's famous sentence to read "The great book of philosophy is written in the language of mathematics.· Mathematics calls attention to itself ,· wrote Jack SChwartz in a famous paper on another kind of misunderstanding. Philosophers in this century have suffered more than ever from the dictatorship of definitiveness. The illusion 01 the final answer, what two thousand years of Western philosophy had failed to accomplish, was thought in this century to have come at last within reach by the slavish imitation of mathematics.
Mathematizing philosophers have claimed that ph i· Iosophy shOuld be made factual and precise. They have given guidelines to philosophical argument which are based ur;x>n mathematical logic. They have contended that the eternal riddles of philosophy can be definitive ly solved by pure reasoning, unencumbered by the weight of history. Confident in their faith in the power of pure thought,they have eut all ties to the past. onthedaimthat Ihe messages 01 past philosophers are now "cbsclete ."
Mathematizing philosophers will agree that tradilional philosophical reasoning is radically different from mathematical reasoning . But this difference, rather than being viewed as strong evidence forthe heterogeneity of philosophy and mathematics, is taken instead as a reason for doing away with non-mathematical philosophy anooemer.
In one area of philosophy the program o. matnematizaHon has succeeded. logic is nowadays no longer a part 01 philoSOphy. Under the name of mathematical logic. it is now a successful and respected branch 01 mathematics , one that has found substantial practical applications in computer science. more so than any other branch of mathematics.
But logic has become mathematical at a price . Mathematicallogic has given up all claims to give a foundation to mathematics. Very few logicians of ou r day believe any longer that mathematical logic has anything to do wilh the way we think.
Mathematicians are therefore mystified by the spectacle 01 philosophers pretending to re-inject philosophi-cal sense into the language of mathe matical logic. A hygienic cleansing of every trace of philosophical reIererce had been the price of admission of logic into the mathemat ical fold . Mathematical logic is now just anothe r branch of mathematics. like topology and probability. The philosophical aspects of mathematical logic are qualitatively no different from the philosophical aspects of topology or tne theOry of func1ions. aside from a curious lerminology which . by an acc ident of chance going back to Leibinz's reading 01 Suarez, goes back to the Middle Ages .
The fake-philosophical term inology of math ematical logic has misled philosophers into believ ing that mathematical logic deals with the truth in the philosophical sense. But this is a mistake . Mathematical logic doe s not deal with the truth , but only with the game of truth. The snobbish symbol-dropping one f inds nowadays in philOsophical papers raises eyebrows among mathematicians . It is as if you were at the grocery store and you watched someone trying to pay his bill with Monopo ly money.
4, Mathematics and Philosophy: Success and Failure
By all accounts. mathematics is the most successful intellectu al und ertaking of mankind . Every problem of mathe matics gets solved. sooner or later. Once it is solved. a mathematical problem is forever finished: no later event will disprove a correct solutio n. As mathematics progresses. problems that were once difficu lt become easy enough to be assigned to schoo lboys. Thus. Euclidean geometry is now taught in the second year of high school. Similarly, the mathematics that mathematicians of my generation have learned in graduate schoo l has now descended to the unde rgraduate level. and the lime is not far wh en it may be taug ht in the high schoo ls.
Not only is every mathe matical probl em solved, but eventually , every mathematical p roblem is proved trivial. The quest fo r ultimate triviality is cha racteristic of the mathematical enterprise .
When we look at the problems ot philosophy. another Picture emerges. Philosophy can be described as the stUdyof a few problems whose statements have changed little since Ihe Greeks : the mind-txx:ty proble m. or the Problem or reality. 10 recall only twO. A dispa ssionate lookatthe history ofphilosophy disdoses two contradidory leatures: first . these problems have in no way been SOlved. nor are they likely to be solved as lOng as philOsophysurvives ; second . every phdosopherwho has HMNNews/ener #6 ever worked on any of these problems has proposed his own -definitive solution.· which have been invariably rejeC1ed as false by his successors .
SUCh Cl'1Jshing historical evidence tcrces us to the conclusion that these two paradoxical features rnJst be an inescapable conexmlitant of the philosophical enterpris e. Failure to conclude has been an outstanding Characteristic 01 p hilosophy throughout its history.
Philosophers of the past have repeatedly stressed the essential role ot failure in ph ilosophy. Jose Ortega y Gasset. for exa"l'le , used to describe ph ilOsophy as "a constant Shipwreck.· However . the lear of lailure did not stop him or any other ph ilosopher from doing philosop hy.
Philosophers' fa ilure to reach any kind 01 agreement does not make their writings any less relevant to the problemsol ourday. We reread with interest the rnJtually contradictory theories 01 mind that Plato. Aristotle . Kant, and Cornie have beq ueathed to us. and we find their opinions timely and enlightening, even in problems ot artificial intelligence.
Unfortunately. the tatter-cay mathematize rs 01 philOsophy are unable to lace up to the inevitability of failure. Borrowing1rom the world of business.theyhave errbraced the ideal of success . Philosophy had better be successful. or else is shou ld be given up. like any business.
The Myth of Precision
Since math ematical concepts are precise, and since mathematics has b een succ essful , they mistakenl y infer that philosoph y would be better off if it dealt with precise conce pts and unequivocal statements . Philosophy will have a better chance at being successful. if it beco mes precise.
The prejudice that a concept rnJst be precisely defined in order to be meaningful . or that an argument must be precisety slated in order to make sense. is one of the most insidious of th e Twentiet h Century . The best known expression 01 this prejudice appears at the end of LUdw ig Willgenstein's Traetatus. and the authof s later wol1<. in particular the Philosophical Investigations. is a loud and repeated retraction of his eartier gaffe.
Looked at lrom the vantage point of ordinary experience. the ideal of precision appears preposterous. Our everyd ay reasoning is not precise . yet it is effect ive. Nature itself .from the cosmos tothe gene. is approximate and inaccu rate.
The negative opinion that many philosophers hold of their own field has caused damage to philosophy. The mathematician's contempt at the philosopher's exaggerated estimation of a method of mathemat ical exposition teeds back onto philosophers' inferiority complex , and funher decreases the philosophers' confidence .
Salutary as this injunction may be in mathematics, it has had disastrous consequences when carried over to philosophy. Whereas mathematics starts with a definition, philosophy endswith a definition. A clear statement of what it is we are talking about is not only missing in philosophy; such a statement would be the end of all philosophy. If we could define our terms , then we would dispense with philosophical argument.
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This mistake betrays the philosophers' pessimistic view of their own field . Unable or afraid as they are of singling out, describing and analyzing the structure of philosophical reasoning, they seek help from the proven technique of another field , a Heldthat is the object of their envy and veneration. Secretly disbelieving in the power of autonomous philosophical reasoning to arrive at the truth, they have surrendered to a slavish and superficial imitation of the truth of mathematics.
There is thus a hidden circularity in tormal mathematical exposition. The theorems are proved staning with definitions, but the definitions themselves are rrctiActually, the -define your terms-imperative is deeply flawed in more than one way . While reading a formal mathematical argument , we are given to believe that the "undefined terms." or the "basic definitons" have been whimsically chosen out of a variety of poss ibilities . Mathematicians take mischievous pleasure in faking the arbitrariness of definition. In actual fact, no mathematical definition is arbitrary . The theorems of mathematics motivate the definitions as much as the definitions m0-tivate the theorems. A good definition is "justified-by the theorems one can prove with it, just like the proof of a theorem is "justified-by appealing to previously given definition.
Thisold injunction has become a platitude in everyday discussions. What could be healthier than a clear statement, right at the beginning, of what it is that we are talking about ? Doesn't mathematics stan with definitions and then develop the properties of the objects that have been defined, by an admirable and inexorable logic?
7. "Define your terms! "
The concepts of philosophy are among the least precise . The mind , perception, memory, cognition, are words that do not have any fixed or clear meaning. Yet, theyoc have meaning . We misunderstand these concepts when we force them to be precise. To use an image due to Wittgenstein, philosophical concepts are l~ethewinding streets of an old city . which we must accept as they are . and which we must familiarize ourselves with by strolling through them, while admiring their historical heritage . Like a Carpathian dictator, the advocates of precision would raze the city to the ground and replace it with a straight and wide Avenue of Precision. This is not , however, the opinion held by our mathematizing philosophers. They are convinced that the axiomatic method is a basic instrument fordiscovery.
They mistakenly believe that mathematicians use the axiomatic method in solving problems and proving theorems. To the misunderstanding of the role of the method they have added the absurd pretension that this presumed method should be adopted in philosophy. Systematically confusing food with medicine, they have pretended to replace the food of philosophical thought with the medicine ct axomatcs.
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The tacts of mathematics are verified and presented by the axiomatic method . One must guard, however, against confusing the presentation of mathematics with the content of mathematics. An axiomatic presentation of a mathematical fact differs from the fact that is being presented as medicine differs from tooc, ttis true that this particular medicine is necessary to keep the mathematician at a safe distance from the self-delusions of the mind. Nonetheless, understanding mathematics means being able to forget the medicine, and to enjoy the load. Confusing mathematics with the axiomatic method for its presentation is as preposterous as confusing the music of John Sebastian Bach with the the techniques for counterpoint in the Baroque age .
The ideal of precision in philosophy has its roots in a misunderstanding of the notion 01 rigor . It has not occurred to our mathematizing philosophers that phlIosophy might be endowed with its own kind of rigor. a rigor that philosophers should dispassionately describe and codify, as mathematicians did with their own kind of rigor a long time ago. Bewitched as they are by the success of mathematics, they remain ensla ved by the prejrdice that the only possible rigor is that of mathematics, and that philosophy has no choice but to imitate it.
6, The Misunderstanding of the Axiomatic Method vated by the theorems that we have previously decided ought to be right.
Instead of focus ing on this strange circularity, pnrIosophers have pretended it does not ex ist, as if the axiomatic method, proceeding linearly from def inition to theore m, were endowed with a def init iveness which is inste ad, as eve ry mathematician knows, a subtle fakery to be debunked .
Perform the follow ing thought experiment . Suppose th at you are given two formal presentations of the same mathematical theory. The def initions of the first presentation are the theorems of the second, and viceve rsa . This situation frequently occurs in mathematics .
Wh ich of the two presentations makes the theory 'rue?-Neither, evidently. What we nave is two presentations of the same theory.
This thought experiment shows that mathematical tlUth is no t brought into being by a formal presentation. Rather, lormal presentation is on ly a technique for d isplaying mathematical truth. The truth of a mathematical theory is distinct from the correctness of any axiomatic method that may be chosen for the presentation of the theory.
MathematiZ ing philosophers have missed this distinction.
The Appeal to Psychology
What will happen to the philosopher who insists on precise statements and clear definitions? Realizing after futile trials that philosophy resists such a treatment, said philosopher will proclaim that most problems previously thought to belong to philosophy are heretofore to be excluded from consideration. He will claim that they are "meaningless,~or at best that they can be settled by an analysis of their statements that will eventually show them to be vacuous. This is not an exaggeration. The classical problems of philosophy have become forbidden topics in many philosophy departments. The mere mention of one such problem by a graduate student or by a junior colleague will result in raised eyebrows,lollowed by severe peoaees.
lnthis dictatorial reg ime , we have witnessed the shrinking of philosophical aetiv~y to an ilTllOverished prob!t §malique. mainly dealing with language.
In order to~st ify their neg lect of most the old and substantial questions of ph ilosophy, our mathematiZing
HMN Newsletter 116
pnrosoprers have resorted to the ruse of daiming that manyquestions formerly thought to be philosophical are instead "purely psychological: ancl that they shou ld be dealt with in the psychology department.
If the ps ychology department 01 anyuniversity we re to consider only one tenth of the problems that philosophers are pawning off on them, then psychology wou ld without question be the most fasc inating of all sub jects .
Maybe it is . But the fact is that psy chologists have no int ention of dealing with problems abandoned by philosophers who ha ve been derelict in the ir dut ies .
One cannot do away with problems by decree . The classical problems of ph ilosophy are now com ing back with a vengeance in the forefront ot science. Fcrexanoie.
the Kantia n problem 01 the conditions of possibility of vis ion, after years of neg lect , is now aga in rearing its old head in bra in science.
Experimental pSYChology , neurophysiology and co mputer science may tum out to be the best friends of traditional philosophy. The awesome ccrroiexaes of the phenomena that are be ing studied in these sciences have convinced scientists (w ell in advance of the philosophical establishment) that progress science will crucially depend on philosophical research of the most classical vein .
The Reduetlonlst Concept of the Mind
What does a mathematician do when trying to work on a mathematical problem? An adequate description of this event might take a thick volume. We shall be content with recalling an old saying, probably going back to the mathematician George P6lya: "Few mathematical problems are ever solved directly.M Every mathematician will agree that an important step in solving a mathematical problem, perhaps the most irrportant step,consists in analyzing other attempts , either atte~s that have been previously carried out or else attempts that one imagines might have been carried out, with a view to discovering how such "Previous · attempts were misled. In short, no mathematician will ever dream of attacking a substantial mathematical problem without first becoming acquainted with the history of the problem. whether the real history or an ideal history that a gifted mathematician might reconstruct.
The solution of a mathematical problem goes hand-inhand with the discovery of the inad equ acy of previous attempts, with the enthusiasm that sees through and does away w ith layers of irrelevancies inherited from the past which cloud the real nature of the problem . In philosophical terms , a mathematician who solves a problem cannot avoid facing up to the historicity of the problem. Mathematics is nothing if not a historical subject par excellence .
Every philosopher since Heraclitus has stressed with striking uniformity the lesson that all thought is constitutively historical. Until, that is, our mathematizing philosophers came along , claiming that the mind is nothing but a complex thinking machine, not to be polluted by the inconclusive ramblings of bygone ages . Historical thought has been dealt a coup de grace by those who today occupy some of the chairs of our philosophy departments . Graduate school requirements inthe history of philosophy have been dropped,togetherwith language requirements , and in their place we find required courses in mathematical logic.
It is important to single out the myth that underlies such drastic revision of the concept of mind. It the myth that believes the mind to be a mechanical device . This myth that has been repeatedly and successfully attacked by the best philosophers of our time (Husserl, John Dewey, Wittgenstein, Austin , Ryle, to name only a few ).
According to this myth , the process of reasoning is viewed as the functioning of a vending machine which, by setting into motion a complex mechanism reminiscent of those we saw in Charlie Chaplin 's film Modern Times, grinds out solutions to problems, like so many Hershey bars. Believers in the theory of the mind as a vending machine will rate human beings accoroing by~degrees" of intelligence, the more intelligent ones being those endowed with bigger and better gears in their brains, as can of course be verified by administering I.Q . tests.
Philosophers believing in the mechanistic myth believe that the solution of a problem is obtained in just one way: by thinking hard about it. They will go as far as asserting that acquaintance with previous contributions to a problem may bias the well-geared mind. A blank mind, they believe, is better geared up to initiate the solulion process than an informed mind.
This outrageous proposition originates from a misconception of how mathematicians work. Our mathematizing philosophers behave like failed mathematicians . They gape at working mathematicians in wide-eyed admiration, like movie fans gaping at posters of Joan Crawford and Bette Davis. Mathematicians are superminds who turn out solutions of one problem after another by dint of pure brain power, simply by staring at a blank piece of paper in intense concentration.
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The myth of the vending machine that grinds solutions out of nothing may perhaps appropriately describe the way to solve the linguistic puzzles of tocay's impoverished philosophy, but this myth is far off the mark in describing the work of mathematicians , or any other serious work .
The fundamental error is one of reductionism. The process of the working of the mind, which may be of interest to physicians but is of no interest to mathematicians , is confused with the progress of thought that is required in the solution of any problem .
This catastrophic misunderstanding of the nature of knowledge is the heritage of one hundred-odd years of pseudo-mathematlzation of philosophy.
The illusion of Definitiveness
The results of mathematics are definitive . No one will ever improve on a sorting algorithm which has been proved best possible . No one will ever discover a new finite simple group, now that the list has been drawn, after a century of research . Mathematics is forever.
We could classify the sciences by how close their results come to being definitive. At the top of the Ilst we would find the sciences 01 lesser philosophical interest, such as mechanics , organic chemistry , botany . At the bottom of the list we would find the more philosophically inclined sciences, such as cosmology and evolutionary biology.
The old problems 01 philosophy, such as mind and matter, reality, perception, are least likely to have "solutions ." In fact, we would be hard put to spell out what might be acceptable as a~solution.~The term~solutionĩ s borrowed from mathematics, and tacitly presupposes an analogy between problems of philosophy and problems of mathema tics that is seriously misleading. Perhaps the use of the word "problem" in philosophy raised expectations that philosophy could not fulfill.
Philosophers of our day go one step farther in their mts-analcqies between philosophy and mathematics. Driven by a mlsptaced belief in definitiveness measured in terms of problems solved, and realizing the futility of any anerrot to produce definitive solutions to any of the classical problems, they have had to change the problems. And where do they think to have fOUnd problems worthy of them? Why, in the world of facts! SCience deals with fads. Whatever i T: is that trad itional philosophy deals with, it is not facts in the scientific sense . Therefore , traditional pl"lilosophy is worthless. This syllogism, wrong on several counts , is preencated on the assumption that no statement is of any value, un less it is a statement 01 fad. Instead of realizing the absurdity of this assurroton, philosophers have swa llowed it, hook, line and sinker, and have busied themselves in making their living on lacts.
But previous philosophers had never been equipped to deal directly with facts , nor had they ever considered facts to be any of their business . Nobody turns to philosophy to learn facts . Facts are the domain 01 science, not of philosophy. And so, a new slogan had to be coined : philosophy should be dealing with facts .
This ·should comes at the end of a long line of other · sl'lOuld 's.· Ph ilosophy shouldbeprecise, it shouldfollow the rules of mathematical logic, it shouJddeline its terms carefully, it shouldignore the lessons of the past , it should be successful at solving its problems, it should produce delinitive solutions. · Pigs should fly ," as the old saying goes .
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But what is the standing 01 such ·should's,-lIatty negated as they are by two thousand years 01 ph ilosophy ? Are we to believe the not so subtle insinuation t hat the royal road to right reason ing will at last be found if we fo llow these imperatives?
There is a rrcre otausible exp lanation 01this barrage of should's. The reality we live in is constituted by myriad contradictions, which traditional philosophy has taken pains to describe with courageous realism . But contradiction cannot be confronted by minds who have put the ir salvation in axiomatics. The real wond is filled with absences, with absurdities, with abnonnaJities, with aberrances , with abominations, with abuses . with Abgrund. But our latter-day philosophers are not concerned with facing up to these unpleasant features of the wond, nor, to be sure, to any real features whatsoever.
They would rather tell us what the world should be like .
They find it satertc escape from distasteful description of what is into point less prescription of what isn't . Like ostriches with their heads in the ground ,theywill meet the fate of those who refuse to acknowledge the lessons of the past andtc meet the Challenge of ourditflOJ!l:present: increasing irrelevance followed by eventual extinction.
